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sion, it may nevertheless have a beneficial result by encouraging "the
judgment creditor to take affirmative steps to satisfy his judgment ....

117

Yet, the potential advantages of the present application do not render
the Internationaldecision less harsh or inequitable. Since the Appellate
Division has correctly applied the law as it currently exists, a legislative
reevaluation would seem appropriate.
62 - ATACHMENT
CPLR 6220: Disclosure order obtained where the assets of a defendant
held by a factoring agent were attached.
ARTICLE

Following the procurement of an order of attachment, CPLR 6220
allows a plaintiff to request that the court issue an order of disclosure
requiring the defendant, or the holder of the defendant's assets, to reveal the nature and extent of the property subject to attachment." 8
Every order of attachment need not be accompanied by an order of
disclosure since the requirement of disclosure rests within the discretion
of the court.1 1 9 However, when a disclosure order is obtained, its
validity rests upon the validity of the underlying order of attachment' 2 0
In Buy Fabrics,Inc. v. ADA Co.,121 the plaintiff brought an action
to recover the balance due on goods sold and delivered to the defendant.
In order to secure any available assets of the defendant, the plaintiff,
pursuant to CPLR 6202,122 attached the defendant's accounts receivable
held by a Georgia bank under a factoring agreement' 23 between it and
117 6 WK&-M

j 5222.21.

118 CPLR 6220 provides:
Upon motion of any interested person, at any time after the granting of an order
of attachment and prior to final judgment in the action, upon such notice as the
court may direct, the court may order disclosure by any person of information
regarding any property in which the defendant has an interest, or any debts
owing to the defendant.
119 The use of the word "may" in CPLR 6220 suggests the discretionary nature of the
disclosure order. See 7A WK&M
6220.02.
120 See Fisher v. Nash, 47 App. Div. 234, 62 N.YS. 646 (4th Dep't 1900); Cronan v.
Schilling, 100 N.Y.S.2d 474 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1950); Clinton Trust Co. v. Compania
Azucarera Central Mabay S.A., 172 Misc. 148, 14 N.Y.S.2d 743 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County), aff'd,
258 App. Div. 782, 15 N.Y.S.2d 721 (1st Dep't 1939) (mem.).
12176 Misc. 2d 607, 351 N.Y.S.2d 522 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1973).
122 CPLR 6202 allows the attachment of any debt or property against which a money
judgment may be enforced pursuant to CPLR 5201. CPLR 5201(b) provides that a money
judgment may be enforced against any debt "whether it was incurred within or without
the state, to or from a resident or non-resident .... "
12 A factor is a financing organization which engages in the purchase of trade
receivables. The function of a factor is to advance credit for its client. In the typical
factoring arrangement, the client, immediately after a sale, sends the invoice of sale to the
factor. Upon receipt of the invoice, the factor transfers cash, equivalent to the invoice
price less an appropriate discount, to the client. Thereafter, the factor collects the amount
Acdue from the client's sale. See G. WE.scu, C. ZLATKOVicH & J. WHrr, IErmEDIrAn
COUNING 431 (1968). Statutory provisions concerning factoring are contained in N.Y. PEns.
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the defendant. Although the garnishee-bank was not authorized to do
business in New York, its factoring department maintained a New York
office. No routine banking transactions, however, were carried on from
this office. After the order of attachment was issued, the plaintiff obtained a disclosure order and served it upon the New York factoring
office of the garnishee.
In seeking to vacate the disclosure order, the garnishee relied upon
the well-established principle that service of attachment on a branch
bank will not serve to secure the assets of a debtor maintained either in
another branch or in the main office of a foreign bank. 124 New York
courts have traditionally considered each branch to be a separate entity
for the purposes of attachment in the belief that to permit service upon
one branch to secure assets located in another branch would result in
a "substantial interference with routine banking business."' 2 5 In Buy
PRop. LAw §§ 3-43 to 3-45 (McKinney 1962). These provisions, however, apply only to
transactions which arose prior to the effective date of the Uniform Commercial Code,
September 27, 1964. See CONSOL. LAw SERvs., APPENDix To UCC, pt. 2, at 5-17 (1967).
124 See, e.g., McCloskey v. Chase Manhattan Bank, 11 N.Y.2d 936, 183 N.E.2d 227, 228
N.Y.S.2d 825 (1962) (mem.); Newtown Jackson Co. v. Animashaun, 148 N.Y.S.2d 66 (Sup. CL
Nassau County 1955) (attachment of deposit account is only effective when made against
branch in which the account is located); Philipp v. Chase Nat'l Bank, 34 N.YS.2d 465 (Sup.
Ct. N.Y. County 1942) (attachment of New York bank does not provide jurisdiction for
debt located in a foreign branch of the bank); Walsh v. Bustos, 46 N.Y.S.2d 240 (N.Y.C.
City Ct. N.Y. County 1943) (main office of foreign bank a separate entity from its New
York agent); cf. Pan-American Bank & Trust Co. v. National City Bank, 6 F.2d 762 (2d
Cir.), cert. denied, 269 U.S. 554 (1925); Bluebird Undergarment Corp. v. Gomez, 139 Misc.
742, 149 N.Y.S. 319 (N.Y.C. City Ct. N.Y. County 1931). But see Cable & Wireless, Ltd. v.
Yokohama Specie Bank, Ltd., 191 Misc. 567, 79 N.Y.S.2d 597 (Sup. CL N.Y. County),
modified and aff'd sub nom. Cable & Wireless, Ltd. v. Lyon, 278 App. Div. 752, 103
N.Y.S.2d 1016 (1st Dep't 1948) (mem.), aft'd, 304 N.Y. 574, 107 N.E.2d 75 (1952). In Cable &r
Wireless, a foreign bank drew a bill of exchange directing its New York branch to pay
the plaintiff-creditor. At the time this suit was commenced, the New York office of the
bank was in the process of a liquidation supervised by the New York Superintendent of
Banks. In holding that the plaintiff was entitled to payment out of the assets of the
branch bank, the Supreme Court, New York County, concluded that "in authorizing

[the bank] to maintain an agency here, New York did not create a separate corporation;
it merely allowed the Japanese ... [bank] to do business here." 191 Misc. 2d at 578, 79
N.Y.S.2d at 608. See also Comment, Attachment: Branch Bank as Separate Entity for
Attachment Purposes: McCloskey v. Chase Manhattan Bank, 48 CoINELL L.Q. 33 (1963).
12576 Misc. 2d at 608, 351 N.Y.S.2d at 523. In considering bank branches as separate
entities for attachment purposes, courts have noted that any other rule would be extremely
cumbersome, particularly in international banking. If, for example, the attachment of a
bank account maintained at a branch could be accomplished by service upon the parent
bank, the branch would have to maintain a constant check on actions pending against
each of its accounts. See Newtown Jackson Co. v. Animashaun, 148 N.Y.S.2d 66 (Sup. CL
Nassau County 1955); Cronan v. Schilling, 100 N.Y.S.2d 474 (Sup. CL N.Y. County 1950).
The validity of this argument, in light of the increasing computerization of banking
services, seems open to question.
At least one court has invoked the separate entity rule for attachment purposes where
a debtor ran a substantial risk of being subjected by a foreign court to liability on a debt
for a second time. See Parker, Peebles & Knox, Inc. v. National Fire Ins. Co., 111 Conn.
383, 150 A. 313 (1930). One early New York decision held that the separate entity doctrine
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Fabrics, the garnishee sought to obtain this separate entity treatment,
contending that the New York factoring office's relationship to it was
akin to that of one bank branch to another. Consequently, if the underlying order of attachment was deemed only to affect the New York
factoring office, the disclosure order would be similarly restricted.'2 6 As
a result, the bank would be relieved from the duty of disclosing the
existence of any records located outside the state relating to assets held
for the defendant.
The Supreme Court, New York County, denied the garnishee's
motion to vacate the order of disclosure.' Without specifically identifying those elements of a factoring arrangement which distinguish a
factor from a branch bank for purposes of the separate entity rule,
Justice Fein rejected the garnishee's contention that the New York
factoring office should be considered the equivalent of a branch. In
holding that the separate entity rule was inapplicable in this instance,
the court observed that the New York office was engaged in a nonbanking function, the fulfillment of a factoring contract128 Unfortunately,
the court revealed little more of the reasoning behind its decision. Presumably, however, the court arrived at its holding in the belief that the
attachment of accounts receivabl' 29 could not be said to result in the
interference with routine banking transactions. 3 0
Clearly, the Buy Fabricscourt determined that, for purposes of obtaining a disclosure order following the attachment of a debtor's assets,
a New York factor, engaged in nonbanking transactions, will not be
deemed separate and distinct from its parent bank. Nevertheless, the
instant decision failed to set forth the precise reasoning in support of its
was applicable where there existed an implied contract of deposit between a bank and
a depositor to repay an instrument only at a branch bank. See Clinton Trust Co. v.
Compania Azucarera Central Mabay SA., 172 Misc. 148, 14 N.Y.S.2d 743 (Sup. Ct. N.Y.
County), af'd, 258 App. Div. 780, 15 N.Y.S2d 721 (Ist Dep't 1939).
120 The validity and scope of the order of disclosure is dependent upon the underlying
order of attachment. See note 120 and accompanying text supra.
127 76 Misc. 2d at 607, 851 N.Y.S.2d at 523.
128 Id. at 608, 851 N.Y.S.2d at 524.
129 In evaluating the question of jurisdiction over the New York factoring office, the
court relied upon the Court of Appeals' decision in Morris Plan Indus. Bank v. Gunning,
295 N.Y. 324, 67 N.E.2d 510 (1946). 76 Misc. 2d at 608, 351 N.Y.S.2d at 524. In essence,
Morris held that the attachment of a factor holding the property of an attachment-debtor
will be valid if jurisdiction is obtained through service upon the factor within the state.
See generally Note, Attachment: CPLR Section 6220 and Discovery of Out-of-State Property, 65 CoLuM. L. REv. 348 (1965).
189 The court added that it was irrelevant for the purposes of this decision that the
New York factoring office was the representative of a bank, the garnishee, which may have
conducted routine banking business with the defendant in another jurisdiction. 76 Misc. 2d
at 610, 851 N.Y.S.2d at 525.
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conclusion. Hopefully, the court, at some future date, will have an opportunity to remedy this deficiency.
AiRiL 71-
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CPLR 7102: Due process reconsidered.
Prejudgment seizure of property without notice and an opportunity for a hearing came under judicial review in Sniadach v. Family
Finance Corp.181 The United States Supreme Court held therein that
summary wage garnishment, absent these basic procedural safeguards,
violated the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment. 13 2 Although such protection was at first afforded only "specialized" property, 33 such as wages, the Court later, in Fuentes v. Shevin, 34 extended
the prophylactic shield to all types of personalty. 3 5
New York was forced to respond to the judicial mandates of
Sniadach and Fuentes in Laprease v. Raymours Furniture Co.,138
131 395 U.S. 337 (1969), discussed in The Quarterly Survey, 46 ST. JOHN'S L. Rxv. 355,
379 (1971).
182 Wisconsin, whose wage garnishment procedure was invalidated in Sniadach,
responded by passing a far-reaching consumer protection law indicating specifically what
procedures afford due process. Wis. STAT. ANN. §§ 421.101-427.105 (1974), discussed in
Note, Self-Help Repossession: The Constitutional Attack, The Legislative Response, And
The Economic Implications, 62 GEo. L.J. 273, 305-09 (1973). Notice and opportunity for a
hearing were deemed indispensable prior to the repossession of chattels from consumers.
Wis. STAT. ANN. § 425.205 (1974). This provision is far more specific than the amended
CPLR 7102. L. 1971, ch. 1051, § 1, eff. July 2, 1971. See note 140 and accompanying text
infra.
133The ill-defined concept of "specialized property" has been formulated through
subsequent judicial construction. Commencing with wages in Sniadach v. Family Finance
Corp., 395 U.S. 337 (1969), it soon extended to include household necessities, Laprease v.
Raymours Furniture Co., 315 F. Supp. 716 (N.D.N.Y. 1970). The concept was later expanded to include tools and equipment used in one's occupation. Cedar Rapids Engineering Co. v. Haenelt, 68 Misc. 2d 206, 326 N.Y.S.2d 653 (Sup. Ct. Sullivan County 1971),
afJ'd, 39 App. Div. 2d 275, 333 N.Y.S.2d 953 (3d Dep't 1972).
Until recently, it appeared that prior discussion attempting to define what constituted "specialized property" had been mooted by Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67 (1972).
The Court therein extended constitutional protection to "any significant property
interest," without classification. Id. at 87. However, in Mitchell v. W.T. Grant Co., 416
U.S. 600 (1974), wherein Fuentes was limited to require a hearing only before a final
deprivation of property, the Supreme Court retreated from its prior position. In distinguishing Sniadach from Mitchell on the basis of wages, the Court seems to have revitalized the "specialized property" concept. See text accompanying notes 152-168 infra.
134 407 US. 67 (1972). The Fuentes Court suggested some "extraordinary situations"
might arise in which summary seizures might be allowed, all of them involving governmental or particularly imperative actions. Private replevin actions, however, were not
included. See 22 BUFFALO L. Ry. 17 (1972).
'85 New York courts further extended the protection to include the right to use gas
and electric utilities, prohibiting the seizure of meters and discontinuance of service in
the absence of necessary constitutional safeguards. Consolidated Edison Co. v. Powell, 77
Misc. 2d 475, 354 N.Y.S.2d 311 (Civ. Ct. Bronx County 1974).
186 315 F. Supp. 716 (N.D.N.Y. 1970), discussed in The Quarterly Survey, 46 ST. JOHN'S
L. REv. 355, 379 (1971).

